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Abstract
We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange
economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop
a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson’s coarse core and
Yannelis’s private core. We investigate the interim negotiation of contracts and
address the two situations of contract delivery : interim and ex post. Our solution
differs from Wilson’s concept because the measurability of strategies in our solution is
postponed until the consumption date (assumed with respect to the information that
will be known by the players at the consumption date). For interim consumption, our
concept differs from Yannelis’s private core because players can negotiate conditional
on proper common knowledge events in our solution, which strengthens the interim
aspect of the game, as we will illustrate with examples.
keywords : coarse core; fine core; private core; α-core; weak-core; incomplete information;
exchange economies; partition model.
JEL Classification codes : C02; C71.
1 Introduction
We define and investigate an interim core concept for normal form games with incomplete
information. We focus on the weak-core [Weber, 1981], which is a slight modification of
the α-core of normal form games [Aumann, 1961, Scarf, 1971, Kajii, 1992] and the core of
exchange economies as initiated by Radner [1968]. The incomplete information aspect is
modeled using Wilson’s [Wilson, 1978] partition model. Specifically, we associate to each
player a σ−field representing the events that the particular player can discern.
∗This is an amended version of the original paper with the same title published in : Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics 58(2015); 38-45.
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Wilson [1978] defined two concepts of the core that targeted two extreme situations: in
the coarse core concept, agents are not permitted to share their information, whereas in
the fine core concept, agents share all their information within coalitions. Wilson [1978]
obtained the non-emptiness of the coarse core by endowing the grand coalition with the
particular power of sharing all its agents’ information, while proper coalitions do not share
any information and negotiate only over “common knowledge” events. The incoherence
of this particular construction has been criticized in the literature, which has spawned
alternative models.
Several interesting studies have been undertaken based on Wilson’s solution concepts.
Allen [1996] provided an overview of the basic literature concerning exchange economies
and cooperative games. Yannelis [1991] defined the private core, in which agents do not
share their private information. Part of the incomplete information aspect of the private
core and other types of models is represented by assuming that agents can only envision
strategies that are measurable with respect to the σ-fields of events that they can dis-
cern, which amounts to assuming that contract delivery is situated at the interim stage.
Koutsougeras and Yannelis [1993] investigated the incentive compatibility of core concepts
under incomplete information. The incentive compatibility problem arises when the pre-
vailing state of nature is not publicly known prior to consumption or contract delivery. The
investigation of the private core was further undertaken by Glycopantis et al. [2001] and
Allen and Yannelis [2001]. Page [1997] formulated a common treatment and proved the
non-emptiness of the core for a unified model that can be reduced to some version of Wil-
son’s coarse and fine cores1 and Yannelis’s private core as a function of information-sharing
rule. Serfes [2001] extends the private core to dynamic economies and defines a non-myopic
core. Additional information on this subject, incentive problems and a cogent mathemat-
ical formulation of the problem of information sharing is provided in Allen [2006]. For a
review of the alternative approach (in incomplete information games), Harsanyi’s model
[Harsanyi, 1967], we refer to the survey of Forges et al. [2002].
In this paper, we formulate an interim core concept in which players negotiate with interim
utilities (conditional expectations) and can object to a status-quo allocation (strategy) for
common knowledge events. The main difference between our concept and Wilson’s con-
cepts is that the measurability of strategies is not related to the information available at
the negotiation date but to the information that will be known by the players at the con-
sumption date. This modelling idea is more natural and lends consistency to the resulting
concepts. Moreover, it solves the incoherence problem in Wilson’s construction. From this
perspective, players faces all circumstances that will be known just before contract delivery.
In other words, they can envision strategies based on the information that will be received
before consumption, and are not restricted to using strategies conceivable under the infor-
mation known during the negotiation stage. Negotiation is conducted using the available
1Indeed, Page [1997] used ex ante utilities, whereas in each of Wilson’s coarse and fine cores, agents
evaluate allocations based on possibly proper events that are smaller than the entire universe.
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information, but strategies can be based on all information that will be known-even future
information-before consumption.
If consumption is situated at the interim stage (no additional information between ne-
gotiation and consumption), then our concept is close to Yannelis’s private core, except
that the negotiation is conducted on proper common knowledge events. Compared with
the private core2, this strengthens the interim aspect of the model, as we will show with
examples in Section 3.2. We address two situations, i.e., whether the prevailing state of
nature is revealed at the consumption date or whether it is not. The weak-core of a normal
form game and the core of an exchange economy are addressed in each case. Note that
Askoura et al. [2013] and Noguchi [2014] provide an ex ante formulation of the α−core,
under Harsanyi’s model.
This paper is divided into two main parts : Section 2 is devoted to ex post contract delivery
and contains most of the notation and technical tools that we use. Section 3 is devoted to
interim contract delivery and concludes with a subsection comparing our concept to the
private core. Section 4 contains a closing comment on information sharing.
2 Ex post contract delivery
In an incomplete information model, two important aspects must be considered : (a)
at what stage are negotiations made, ex ante or interim?3 and (b) at what stage is
contract delivery made, ex ante, interim or ex post? For (a), this paper discusses the
interim case. For (b), two consumption dates, interim and ex post, are addressed. The
interim consumption is technically accounted for by the assumption of the measurability of
players’ strategies, which can be roughly addressed by acknowledging that players can only
envision strategies that are measurable with respect to their respective σ-fields4. Then,
this assumption is related to conditions under which the game takes place. For instance,
it is unnecessary if the prevailing state (or, generally, a finer σ−field than all players’
information σ-fields) is revealed before contract delivery, and it is necessary otherwise. In
other words, if contract delivery is made at the ex post stage, the measurability condition
can be relaxed, such as is the case in Volij [2000], in which the agents’ utilities are updated
again following the information that agents possess at the negotiation step. Volij [2000]
obtained an intermediate core concept between the coarse and the fine core of Wilson.
In Okada [2012], a new type of core (informational core) was introduced in which the
measurability assumption is no longer required. In Kobayashi [1980], measurability was
assumed with respect to a σ-field that will be revealed before contract delivery and a
conditional core was introduced. In this section, consumption is organized ex-post.
2This comment may be put in some perspective by the version of the private core defined in
Hahn and Yannelis [2001] and in De Castro et al. [2011] as a weak interim private core. See point 2
in Section 3.2 for a discussion of this concept : in particular, it may fail to be nonempty under usual
assumptions.
3The ex post situation corresponds to complete information.
4Alternatively, new σ−fields are generally defined by the information sharing rule.
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2.1 Conceptual aspects-Normal form games
Let (Ω,F , µ) be a probability space. Ω represents the set of states of nature. The prob-
ability µ is a common objective prior. In the sequel, two events with a µ-null symmetric
difference will be confused. N = {1, ..., n} is the set of players. If S ⊂ N is a coalition,
then we denote by −S the coalition of the remaining players. The action space of player
i is denoted Ai. It is assumed to be a compact convex subset of a (separable) reflexive
Banach space Xi. The σ−algebra B(Ai) stands for the Borel σ−field of Ai.
Set A =
∏
i∈N Ai. The information of each player i is represented by a sub-σ-algebra
Fi of F . The elements of Fi represent the events that player i can discern. In other
words, for every E ∈ Fi, player i knows whether the prevailing state is in E or in its
complement, which is denoted ∁E. Wilson [1978] defined the fine core to be the core
concept corresponding to the situation in which agents within a coalition S pool all their
information. Then, they can discern all events in the coarsest sub-σ-algebra generated by
∪
i∈S
Fi, which is denoted ∨
i∈S
Fi. Analogously, Wilson’s coarse core is that in which agents do
not reveal their information within coalitions or use common knowledge events or events
contained therein for a coalition S in the field ∩
i∈S
Fi, which is denoted ∧
i∈S
Fi.
R1) Assume that there is a finite partition of Ω generating the σ-algebra ∨
i∈N
Fi; then, every
sub-σ-field Fi is generated by a partition of Ω. Denote by P the coarsest partition
generating the field ∨
i∈N
Fi. Denote by Pi the coarsest partition of Ω generating Fi.
We can assume that µ(K) > 0 for all K ∈ Pi. The elements of Pi are the finest
events that can be discerned by player i without sharing information with other
players. Observe that for every K ∈ P, there is a unique Ki ∈ Pi such that K ⊂ Ki.
Each agent i ∈ N is assumed to know, before the negotiation date, the smallest (finest)
event (an element of Pi) in his field Fi containing the realized state of nature
5.
For each player i, associate a utility function
ui : A× Ω→ IR+
In the sequel, we assume that
• the information fields Fi, i ∈ I, and the other components of the game are publicly
known.
For a player, knowing the whole structure of the information, that is, all the fields Fi, i ∈ N,
does not provide him with more information if he is only assumed to discern, in his own
field, whether any event contains the prevailing state.
Player i’s strategy6, xi, is a function from Ω into his space of actions
7. The measurability
condition requires that xi be measurable with respect to the σ−field containing the events
5This is only true in the case in which Fi is generated by a partition of Ω, as assumed above; otherwise,
at this stage, player i can only know whether the realized state is in E or in ∁E, for all E ∈ Fi.
6Allocation in the case of exchange economies.
7Consumption set in the case of an exchange economy.
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that player i can discern. For instance, this function must be Fi-measurable in the absence
of information sharing or, for example, ∨
j∈S
Fj-measurable if i belongs to the coalition S
and S shares all its members’ information. We consider the measurability condition by
distinguishing two situations :
• If the prevailing state of nature is not known before consumption takes place (contract
delivery), then it is reasonable to assume the measurability condition. Without
information sharing, this condition means that player i plays a constant function
in every set Ki ∈ Pi. As i can only distinguish an event Ki ∈ Pi containing the
prevailing state and the consumption takes place at this step, i.e. before the exact
prevailing state is revealed, i plays a unique action, regardless of the exact realized
w ∈ Ki, by seeking to maximize his mathematical expectation computed on Ki.
• If the prevailing state of nature is known before consumption occurs, we can withdraw
this measurability condition. Indeed, if each player knows the prevailing state at the
consumption date, then he plays the action corresponding to the image of his strategy
at this realized state8.
In this setting, the measurability condition is intimately related to the incentive com-
patibility problem. In other words, these two conditions are to be assumed or ignored
simultaneously following the situation we consider.
In this section, we consider the situation in which
C1) the realized state is known before consumption takes place8.
Thus, we do not require the incentive compatibility of solutions nor the measurability
condition.
C2) All strategies are assumed to be F -measurable.
Remark 1. If only the information carried by a σ-field H such that F ⊃ H ⊃ ∨
i∈N
Fi is
revealed (the realized events of H) before consumption, then it is reasonable to assume the
measurability of all strategies with respect to H. However, in this case, it is mathematically
possible to modify the data of the game to withdraw this measurability condition (with respect
to H instead of F) by considering the game issued from the probability space (Ω,H, µ|H).
The game takes place as follows : At a given date, players receive their own private in-
formation that makes them able to recognize whether any set (only) in their own field
contains the prevailing state. Following this date, players negotiate. They can form coali-
tions9 at this stage. At the end of this step, the true realized state is revealed. Thereafter,
consumption (or contract delivery) takes place.
8Assuming that the whole information field F allows precise knowledge of the exact realized state of
nature.
9The information-sharing role must be clarified in the negotiation process. Precisely, a player can either
reveal his information to his coalition or not.
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The set of strategies AS of a coalition S is an |S|-tuple of F -measurable functions xi : Ω→
Ai, i ∈ S. The set of strategies of the grand coalition AN is sometimes denoted simply
by A. For each coalition S ⊆ N , AS is considered as a subset of
∏
i∈S
L1(Ω, µ,Xi) that is
endowed with the product of the weak topologies σ(L1(µ,Xi), L∞(µ,X
∗
i )). The L1 spaces
here stand for the spaces of Bochner integrable functions. The separability of the sets Ai
makes the strong measurability identical to Borel measurability (the image spaces Ai are
endowed with the Borel σ-field). For this reason we confuse these notions. Note that the
sets AS are weakly compact [Diestel et al., 1993, U¨lger, 1991].
Associate to every player i the utility Ui defined on A by
Ui(x)w = ui(x(w), w)
Assume that
• for every i, ui is B(A)⊗F -measurable and supa∈A |ui(a, ·)| is integrably bounded.
Denote the described game by
G = ((Ω,F , µ), N, Ai, ui,Fi)
In this paper, until section 4, we assume that
C3) Information is not shared within coalitions.
Then, every player i must evaluate his expected payoff with respect to the conditional
expectation defined for x ∈ A by :
E(Ui(x)|Fi) : Ω→ IR
Indeed, player i can only know whether a particular event of Fi may contain the prevailing
state at the decision (negotiation) step.
Definition 1. A coalition S blocks a given strategy x ∈ A, if there exists a common-
knowledge event F ∈ ∧
i∈S
Fi, and if the exists ε > 0 and if S possesses an admissible
strategy yS ∈ AS, such that for all y−S ∈ A−S,
E(Ui(yS, y−S)|Fi)w > E(Ui(x)|Fi)w+ε, for a.e. w ∈ F, ∀i ∈ S
In such a circumstance, we also posit that S blocks x on F .
The interim core of G is the set of non-blocked strategies.
Remark 2. The concept defined above reduces to an ex ante core if all of the informa-
tion fields are trivial Fi = {∅,Ω}. Indeed, players evaluate strategies with respect to the
mathematical expectation E(Ui(x)) =
∫
Ω
ui(x(w), w)dµ.
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The previous definition is a generalization of the Weber’s [Weber, 1981] weak-core which
can be adapted for games with a finite set of players as follows.
Definition 2. Consider a game (N, Yi, hi, i ∈ N) where N is a finite set of players, Yi the
set of strategies of i ∈ N , and hi : Y =
∏
i∈N Yi → IR the utility of i ∈ N . A coalition
S ⊂ N is said to block y ∈ Y iff it possesses a strategy xS ∈ YS, and there exists ε > 0
such that,
hi(xS, x−S) > hi(y) + ε, ∀x−S ∈ X−S, ∀i ∈ S.
The weak-core is the set of non blocked strategies.
By removing ε in the previous definition, we obtain, the α-core of Aumann [1961]. The
non-emptiness of the interim core for normal form games is shown in the following :
Theorem 1. Assume that each ui is concave and upper-semicontinuous in its first argu-
ment, then the interim core of G is nonempty.
Proof. Following the idea of Wilson [1978], associate to G a new gameG′ defined as follows :
the set of players is (i, K), i ∈ N,K ∈ Pi. Denote by J the new set of indices. The set
of strategies of j = (i, K) is Yj = L1(Ω, µ, Ai).χK , where χK is the characteristic function
of K. Note that the sets Yj are weakly compact. Set Y =
∏
j∈J Yj and define the linear
function (isomorphism) L : Y → A by x = L(y), xi =
∑
K∈Pi
y(i,K). Associate to each
player j = (i, K) the utility gj defined for y ∈ Y by
gj(y) =
∫
K
ui(L(y)(w), w)dµ = µ(K)E(Ui(L(y))|Fi)v, ∀v ∈ K
The set of admissible coalitions consists of subsets S ⊂ J associated to pairs (S0, F )
consisting of a coalition S0 ⊂ N of the initial game and a common knowledge event
F ∈ ∧
k∈S0
Fk as (S0, F ) = {(i, K) : i ∈ S0;K ∈ Pi and K ⊂ F}. The weak-core of G
′ is the
set of strategies y that are not blocked by an admissible coalition. It is clear that if y is
in the weak-core of G′, then L(y) is in the interim core of G. Note that in Definition 1,
the functions E(Ui(yS, y−S)|Fi) and E(Ui(x)|Fi), i ∈ S, depend only on the restrictions of
(yS, y−S) and x to F , i.e., on (yS, y−S)|F and x|F .
We now check the routine regularity assumptions needed for the components of G′. Let
us prove that for every j = (i, K) ∈ J , gj is upper semi-continuous and concave on Y .
The concavity of gj results trivially from the concavity of ui in its first argument. Let us
prove that gj is upper semi-continuous on Y . Following the Eberlein-Sˇmulian theorem, as
we are working in a weakly compact space (note that a finite product of weakly compact
sets is weakly compact), we can use sequences instead of nets to describe the closure of
subsets and, consequently, to also describe the upper semi-continuity of real functions. Let
yn converge weakly to y. Without loss of generality, consider a subsequence still denoted
yn such that lim gj(y
n) = lim sup gj(y
n). The existence of the sup-bound of gj is ensured
because supa |ui(a, ·)| is integrably bounded.
Following Diestel et al. [1993], there is a sequence hn ∈ co{y
k : k ≥ n} such that hn
converges a.e. to y, and hence L(hn) also converges a.e. to L(y). Then, from the upper
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semicontinuity of ui, for a.e. w ∈ Ω, lim sup ui(L(h
n)(w), w) ≤ ui(L(y)(w), w). Hence, by
Fatou’s Lemma :
lim sup gj(h
n) ≤
∫
K
lim sup ui(L(h
n)(w), w)dµ ≤
∫
K
ui(L(y)(w), w)dµ
From the concavity of ui, for every n ∈ IN, there is k ≥ n such that gj(h
n) ≥ gj(y
k). It
follows that
lim sup gj(y
n) ≤ gj(y)
This proves the upper semi-continuity of the functions gj.
Associate the characteristic function form game GC = (V, J), where the value function V
is defined by :
V (S) =
{
v ∈ IRJ : there is yS ∈ YS such that for all y−S ∈ Y−S
gj(yS, y−S) ≥ vj, for every j ∈ S
}
on every coalition S that is admissible for G′. For the other types of coalitions, simply let
V (S) = IRS− × IR
J\S.
It is obvious that to an element v of the core of GC corresponds an element in the weak-
core of G′. It is precisely an element y ∈ Y such that the grand coalition (admissible since
it is associated to (N,Ω)) can ensure at least the gains vj at y for its members, where v is
in the core of GC . Indeed, let v in the core of GC and y ∈ Y , such that gj(y) ≥ vj for all
j ∈ J . Hence, if an admissible coalition S blocks y for the blocking concept of definition
2, then there exists ε > 0 and xS ∈ YS such that gj(xS, x−S) > gj(y) + ε ≥ vj + ε, for all
j ∈ S and all x−S ∈ Y−S. By construction of V (S), v belongs to the interior of V (S) and
then, this is a contradiction with the fact that v is in the core of GC . Note that if gj does
not depend on y−j, for every j ∈ J , (this is the case of exchange economies in absence
of externalities) then the previous argument works for the α−core blocking concept, i.e.,
without the need of the ε > 0.
For non-vacuity, Let us apply the result of Scarf [1967] that guarantee the existence of an
element in the core of GC under the following conditions :
1) V (S) is closed and nonempty for every S ⊂ J and V (J) is bounded from above,
2) V (S) is comprehensive for every S ⊂ J , i.e., if v ∈ V (S) and v′ ≤ v (coordinatewise),
then v′ ∈ V (S),
3) GC is balanced, that is, for every balanced collection of coalitions S with positive
balancing weights δS, S ∈ S , one has
∩S∈SV (S) ⊂ V (J)
where the collection of coalitions S , with associated positive (balancing) weights
δS, S ∈ S , is said to be balanced precisely when∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δS = 1, ∀j ∈ J
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The verification of 1) and 2) is easy. Indeed, 1) follows from the positivity, upper semi-
continuity of the functions gj and the compactness of the strategy sets, and 2) is trivial
from the definition of the sets V (S). For 3), we apply an adapted Scarf trick [Scarf, 1971].
Take a balanced collection S with associated positive balancing weights δS, S ∈ S , and
v ∈ ∩S∈SV (S). For every S ∈ S , let y
S ∈ YS such that gj(y
S, y−S) ≥ vj for every j ∈ S
and y−S ∈ Y−S. If S is non-admissible, then y
S can be taken arbitrarily because of the
positivity of the functions ui. Let the element y = (y1, ..., y|J |) defined by yj =
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSy
S
j .
Then, y ∈ Y by convexity and for any fixed j ∈ J , y can be expressed as
y =
∑
S∈C ,S∋j
αS(h
S
1 , ..., h
S
|J |)
where hSm ∈ Ym is defined by
hSm(w) =


ySm(w), if m ∈ S,
∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δCy
C
m(w)∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δC
, if m /∈ S.
where the last summations (and all of the following) are made, if not stated otherwise,
over the coalitions C (or S) belonging to S .
Indeed, for every m,
∑
S∈C ,S∋j
δSh
S
m =
∑
S∋j,S∋m
δSy
S
m +
∑
S∋j,S 6∋m
δS
∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δCy
C
m∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δC
.
To conclude that the previous quantity yields ym, it suffices to remark that∑
S∋j,S 6∋m
δS =
∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δC ,
which is a consequence of the balancedness of the collection of coalitions :
1 =
∑
S∋j
δS =
∑
S∋j,S 6∋m
δS +
∑
S∋m,S∋j
δS =
∑
C∋m,C 6∋j
δC +
∑
S∋m,S∋j
δS =
∑
C∋m
δC = 1.
Now with the help of the concavity of gj , we obtain
gj(y1, ..., y|J |) = gj(
∑
S∋j
δS(h
S
1 , ..., h
S
|J |)
= gj(
∑
S∋j
δS(y
S, hS−S))
≥ vj
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This establishes the balancedness of GC , and consequently the non-vacuity of its core, and
then that of the weak-core of G′. Take any y in the weak-core of G′. Obviously, L(y) is in
the interim core of the initial game.
2.2 Interim core for exchange economies
In this section, we apply the above interim core concept for exchange economies. The
difference with respect to normal form games is that we do not require externalities in
player payoffs and the strategy sets are constrained.
Most of the hypotheses considered above remain unchanged. We address only those new
hypotheses related to exchange economies and, if not expressly stated, we use the previous
conditions.
For exchange economies, define the consumption set of player i by Ci = IR
l
+ for all i ∈ N ,
where l is a positive integer. For every i ∈ N , let ei : Ω → Ci be the initial endowment
of agent i. Assume that ei is F -measurable. Note that this condition implies that players
do not precisely know their initial endowments at the interim negotiation step. However,
this information will be available at ex post contract delivery.
In contrast with the previous paragraph, allocations are subject to constraints. The set of
admissible allocations CS of a coalition S ⊆ N is an |S|-tuple of F -measurable functions
xi : Ω→ Ci, i ∈ S, such that
∑
i∈S xi(w) =
∑
i∈S ei(w) for a.e w ∈ Ω.
Assume that
• the initial endowments ei belong respectively to L1(Ω, µ, Ci), i.e., they are µ-integrable.
Denote by Pi(C ) the projection of C = CN on L1(Ω, µ, Ci) and note that Pi(C ) contains
all of the projections of the sets CS on L1(Ω, µ, Ci). The µ-integrability of the initial
endowments makes the sets CS and the sets Pi(C ) weakly compact as we show in the
following :
Lemma 1. Under the condition of the integrability of ei, i ∈ N, the spaces CS, S ⊂ N ,
and the projections Pi(C ) of C on L1(Ω, µ, Ci) are weakly compact.
Proof. For a.e. w ∈ Ω, for all S ⊆ N , all x ∈ CS satisfies xi(w) ∈ {y ∈ IR
l
+ : 0 ≤ y ≤∑
j∈S
ej(w)}, and this last set is compact in IR
l. Furthermore,
∫
E
‖x‖|S|ldµ =
∑
i∈S
∫
E
‖xi‖ldµ
≤
∑
i∈S
∫
E
‖
∑
j∈N
ej‖ldµ
≤ |S|
∑
j∈N
∫
E
‖ej‖ldµ
µ(E)→0
−→ 0
where ‖.‖|S|l stands for the sum of the Euclidean norms ‖.‖l on the factor spaces IR
l. That
is, CS is pointwise bounded and uniformly integrable. As it is obviously weakly closed, it
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follows from Corollary 9 in U¨lger [1991] that it is weakly compact. The weak compactness
of the sets Pi(C ) results from the continuity of the corresponding projections.
For exchange economies, externalities are not considered, and the utility of player i thus
depends only on xi and w. To clarify a difference, denote it as
ψi : Ci × Ω→ IR+
Assume that
• for every i, ψi is B(Ci)⊗F -measurable and supai∈Ci |ψi(ai, ·)| is integrably bounded.
The other changes are analogous; thus another utility Ψi, defined on L1(Ω, µ, Ci) by
Ψi(xi)w = ψi(xi(w), w), is associated to each player. In the absence of information sharing,
the conditional expectation of player i is defined by E(Ψi(xi)|Fi).
Denote the described exchange economy by
E = ((Ω,F , µ), N, Ci, ψi,Fi, ei)
Definition 3. A coalition S blocks a given strategy x ∈ C , if there exists a common-
knowledge event F ∈ ∧
i∈S
Fi, and if S possesses an admissible strategy y
S ∈ CS , such that,
E(Ψi(y
S
i )|Fi)w > E(Ψi(xi)|Fi)w, for a.e. w ∈ F, ∀i ∈ S
In such a circumstance, we also posit that S blocks x on F . The interim core of E is the
set of non-blocked strategies.
Theorem 2. Assume that each ψi is concave and upper-semicontinuous in its first argu-
ment, then the interim core of E is nonempty.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, except for the following : the initial endowments
of the players j = (i, K) in the new game (exchange economy), which we can denote here
E ′, defined at the beginning, are defined by ej = eiχK . Set Yj = L1(Ω, µ, Ci)χK . The set
of admissible allocations for a coalition S in E ′ is defined by C ′S = {y
S ∈
∏
j∈S
Yj :
∑
j∈S
ySj =∑
j∈S
ej a.e.}. The weak compactness of these sets is shown in the previous Lemma. The
upper semi-continuity of the functions gj may be shown analogously on the weak compact
sets Pj(C
′).
The admissibility of the combination y defined by yj =
∑
S∋j
δSy
S
j (needed for the balanced-
ness of the associated characteristic form game GC) must be checked for the grand coalition
as follows : observe first that for a.e. w ∈ Ω,
∑
j∈J
ej(w) =
∑
i∈N
ei(w). Then a.e.
∑
j∈J
yj =
∑
j∈J
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSy
S
j =
∑
S∈S
δS
∑
j∈S
ySj =
∑
S∈S
δS
∑
j∈S
ej =
∑
j∈J
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSej =
∑
j∈J
ej
11
This formula establishes that y is admissible. The fact that gj(yj) ≥ vj, for every j, results
from the concavity of the functions gj. The balancedness of GC results immediately.
Indeed, thanks to the absence of externalities, we do not need the second calculation
presenting, for j, y =
∑
S∋j
δSh
S. Thanks to the absence of externalities an element of the
core of GC provides directly an element in the α−core of E
′ (there is no need to use the
ε-approximation, as mentioned in the previous proof) and then an element in the interim
core of E . For further details on this proof, please refer to the detailed proof of Theorem
4 in the next section.
3 Interim contract delivery
In this section, we consider the situation in which the realized state is not known prior to
consumption. Our aim is to establish the results of the previous section in this setting.
The game is organized as follows: at a given date, players receive their own private infor-
mation that makes them able to recognize whether any set, only in their own field, contains
the prevailing state. After this date, players negotiate, and they can form coalitions at this
step. After the negotiation step, but still in the interim stage, contract delivery takes
place. The true state is not revealed before consumption. Therefore, assume the
• Honest reporting hypothesis.
This hypothesis is required for contract delivery. It means that agents do not misreport
their realized events to improve their utilities at contract delivery. As the forthcoming
solution concept is close to the private core concept, let us underline that some versions of
the private core are known to be incentive compatible (Koutsougeras and Yannelis [1993],
Hahn and Yannelis [2001]; see also Hahn and Yannelis [1997] on this subject). Let us also
underline that some new cores that have been recently defined [De Castro et al., 2011]
using ambiguity theory ingredients are also incentive compatible. In this paper, we have
adopted an objective common belief governing the states of nature. Then, (conditional)
expected utilities seem more appropriate. Even if the above interim core concept may be
formulated successfully in the setting with ambiguity aversion, the techniques as elaborated
thus far [De Castro et al., 2011, Angelopoulos and Koutsougeras, 2015] cannot contribute,
in our view, to the study of incentive problems in our case. Indeed, the tractability of the
interim focusing of the concept may be difficult even with these new tools. Aside from
the existence of many incentive compatibility concepts, this problem may be difficult to
address and may involve restrictive conditions (monotonicity and continuity). For now,
assume that there is a well-informed authority that may guarantee the applicability of the
negotiated contracts.
Assume all the hypotheses of subsection 2.1, except C1) and C2). We instead assume the
opposite of C1), and below we describe strategy sets as a substitution for C2).
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The set of strategies MS of a coalition S is an |S|-tuple of functions xi : Ω → Ai, i ∈ S,
such that xi is Fi-measurable for each i ∈ S. The set of strategies of the grand coalition
MN is occasionally denoted simply by M. For each coalition S ⊆ N , MS is considered
to be a subset of
∏
i∈S
L1(Ω, µ, Ai) endowed with the L1 norm topology. Note that condition
R1) on the existence of finite partitions generating player information fields together with
the measurability of player strategies with respect to their sub-σ-fields render the sets of
strategies of finite dimensions. Then, the weak and norm topologies coincide on these
sets and make them obviously compact. Further recall that the measurability condition
assumed on strategies means that : without any other information regarding the realized
state, player i plays a constant function in each K ∈ Pi, which is a meaningful condition
because the consumption occurs at the interim stage. In fact, player i knows only the
smallest event K ∈ Pi containing the prevailing state of the world.
Define the game just described in which consumption is interim by
GI = ((Ω,F , µ), N, Ai, ui,Fi)
The blocking concept and the interim core are defined similarly by replacing in definition
1 : A with M, AS with MS, A−S with M−S and G with GI .
Theorem 3. Assume that each ui is concave and upper-semicontinuous in its first argu-
ment, then the interim core of GI is nonempty.
The proof is omitted because it is similar to that of theorem 1, except that the set of
strategies Yj, for j = (i, K), must be set as Yj = AiχK .
3.1 Exchange economies
We consider here an exchange economy. Thus, consider the hypotheses of subsection 2.2.
As above, we address in the sequel only the necessary changes related to the measurability
assumption.
• ei : Ω → Ci is the initial endowment of player i ∈ N , ei is assumed to be Fi-
measurable.
This condition means that players know their initial endowments at the interim stage.
As in section 2.2, no externalities are assumed on payoffs with respect to strategies; thus
denote ψi : Ci×Ω→ IR+ as the utility of player i, and associate to i the second utility Ψi
analogously.
The set of allocations TS of a coalition S is an |S|-tuple of functions xi : Ω → Ci, i ∈ S,
such that xi is Fi-measurable for each i ∈ S and
∑
i∈S xi(w) =
∑
i∈S ei(w) for a.e. w ∈ Ω.
The set of allocations of the grand coalition TN is occasionally denoted simply by T . For
each coalition S ⊆ N , TS is considered to be a subset of
∏
i∈S
L1(Ω, µ, Ci) endowed with the
L1 norm topology.
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Denote by
EI = ((Ω,F , µ), N, Ci, ψi,Fi, ei)
an exchange economy with incomplete information in which the consumption is organized
at the interim stage.
The blocking concept and the interim core for EI are defined similarly by replacing, in the
definition 3, C with T , CS with TS, E with EI .
Theorem 4. Assume that each ψi is concave and upper-semicontinuous in its first argu-
ment, then the interim core of EI is nonempty.
As the proof of the analogous Theorem 2 is not detailed, we choose to provide the integral
proof of this theorem for the reader’s convenience.
Proof. Following the idea of Wilson [1978], we begin by associating a new game (economy),
denoted E ′, defined as follows : the set of players is (i, K), i ∈ N,K ∈ Pi. Denote by
J the new set of indices. The consumption set of j = (i, K) is Yj = IR
l
+χK , where
χK is the characteristic function of K. Set Y =
∏
j∈J Yj. Observe that Y is of finite
dimension, and consequently, the L1 norm on the set of allocations of players L1(Ω, µ, Ci)
induces a norm equivalent to the esssup norm on the corresponding sets Yj. The initial
endowment of j = (i, K) is e′j = eiχK . The admissible set of allocations for a coalition
S is T ′S = {yS = (yj)j∈S :
∑
j∈S yj =
∑
j∈S e
′
j a.e. and yj ∈ Yj}. Clearly, T
′
S is compact
for every S; it is in fact of finite dimension, bounded and closed, as an intersection of a
closed set with an inverse image of a singleton by a linear map. Define the linear function
L : Y →
∏
i∈N L1(Ω, µ, Ci) by x = L(y), xi =
∑
K∈Pi
y(i,K). Observe that for a.e. w ∈ Ω,∑
j∈J
e′j(w) =
∑
i∈N
ei(w) and that y is admissible for the grand coalition J in the new game iff
L(y) is admissible for N in the initial game.
Associate to a player j = (i, K) the utility gj defined for yj ∈ Yj by
gj(yj) =
∫
K
ψi(yj(w), w)dµ = µ(K)E(Ψi(L(y)i)|Fi)v, ∀v ∈ K
The set of admissible coalitions consists of subsets S ⊂ J associated to pairs (S0, F ), where
S0 ⊂ N is a coalition of the economy EI and F ∈ ∧
k∈S0
Fk is a common knowledge event :
S = {(i, K) : i ∈ S0;K ∈ Pi and K ⊂ F}.
Denote by Pj(T
′) the projection of T ′ = T ′N on Yj, and note that Pj(T
′) contains all of
the projections of the sets T ′S on Yj, for every S ∋ j. Clearly, Pj(T
′) is compact.
Let us show that, for every j = (i, K) ∈ J , gj is upper semi-continuous and concave on Yj.
The concavity of gj results trivially from the concavity of ψi in its first argument. For the
upper semi-continuity of gj, let y
n
j converge to yj. Then, y
n
j converges a.e. to yj. From the
upper semi-continuity of ψi, for a.e. w ∈ Ω, lim sup ψi(y
n
j (w), w) ≤ ψi(yj(w), w). Hence,
by Fatou’s Lemma
lim sup gj(y
n
j ) ≤
∫
K
lim sup ψi(y
n
j (w), w)dµ ≤
∫
K
ψi(yj(w), w)dµ
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The existence of the upper bound of gj is ensured by the fact that supa |ψi(a, ·)| is integrably
bounded. This proves the upper semi-continuity of the functions gj .
Associate the characteristic function form game GC = (V, J), where the value function V
is defined by
V (S) =
{
v ∈ IRJ : there is yS ∈ T ′S such that gj(y
S
j ) ≥ vj, for every j ∈ S
}
on every admissible coalition S of E ′ (that is associated to a pair (S0, F ), as described
above). For the other form of coalitions, simply put V (S) = IRS− × IR
J\S.
It is obvious that to an element v of the core of GC corresponds an element in the core
of E ′ (allocations not blocked by admissible coalitions). It is precisely an element y ∈ T ′
such that the grand coalition can ensure at least the gains given by the corresponding
components of v at y for its members, where v is in the core of GC (note that the grand
coalition is always admissible, since it is associated to (N,Ω)). Let us apply, for non-vacuity,
the result of Scarf [1967] that guarantee an element in the core of GC under conditions
1)-3) restated in the proof of Theorem 1.
The verification of 1) and 2) is straightforward. Indeed, 1) follows from the positivity of ψi’s
(0 ∈ V (S), for every S), the upper semi-continuity of the functions gj and the compactness
of the admissible sets of allocations. Condition 2) results trivially from the definition of the
sets V (S). For 3), take a balanced collection S with associated positive balancing weights
δS, S ∈ S , and v ∈ ∩S∈SV (S). Then, for every S ∈ S , let y
S ∈ T ′S such that gj(y
S
j ) ≥ vj
for every j ∈ S. If S is non-admissible, then yS can be taken arbitrarily. Let the element
y = (y1, ..., y|J |) be defined by yj =
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSy
S
j . Let us check the admissibility of y, i.e.
y ∈ T ′. We can write a.e.
∑
j∈J
yj =
∑
j∈J
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSy
S
j =
∑
S∈S
δS
∑
j∈S
ySj =
∑
S∈S
δS
∑
j∈S
e′j =
∑
j∈J
∑
S∈S ,S∋j
δSe
′
j =
∑
j∈J
e′j
This formula establishes that y ∈ T ′. The fact that gj(yj) ≥ vj , for every j, follows from the
concavity of the functions gj. The balancedness of GC results immediately. Consequently,
the core of GC is nonempty and so is the core of E
′. For any y in the core of E ′, x = L(y) ∈ T
is clearly in the interim core of the initial economy EI .
3.2 Comparison with interim private cores
1. In some of the literature cited in the introduction, the welfare of the agents is eval-
uated by the mathematical expectation computed on the entire universe of states of
nature even if the concepts addressed are interim. In some others, as in the original
definition of the private core, the evaluation is effected by means of a conditional
expectation (an interim utility) measured and considered, at the negotiation step,
at every state of nature, including possibly commonly known unrealized events. In
other words, to block an outcome, a coalition must improve upon its members’ (in-
terim) utilities at every state of nature, including states of unrealized events. Ideally,
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in the interim situation, the agents may know that proper events have been realized.
Then, conditional expectations seem to be more appropriate and preferably be con-
sidered on proper realized events at the negotiation date. Unlike the private core,
our concept defined above fulfils these criteria. To highlight this point, consider the
situation of an economy EI described in Subsection 3.1. Let us make a comparison
with the (interim) private core in its original definition [Yannelis, 1991], in which
blocking is only possible over the entire Ω. More precisely, S blocks x ∈ T iff there
exists an allocation yS ∈ TS such that
E(Ψ(ySi )|Fi)w > E(Ψ(xi)|Fi)w, for a.e. w ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S
Consider any economy as described above in which Ω is finite and assume that at
one state of nature, say w0 ∈ Ω, that all players discern as a non-null proper event,
all the utilities are equal regardless of the manner in which players pool their initial
endowments. Assume that negotiations are made at the interim stage. If we adopt
the definition of Yannelis [1991]10, all issues of the game belong to the private core.
Indeed, no coalition can improve upon the conditional expectations of its members
at the fixed state w0. Clearly, this is inappropriate if players can commonly discern
another realized event not containing w0 on which they can improve their utilities.
This situation, extreme as it may seem, is solved by the interim core defined above.
Indeed, players can block allocations on proper events, and hence they may improve
their expected utilities at least relative to the common knowledge event Ω \ {w0}.
2. The interim private core of Hahn and Yannelis [2001], p. 499, and the weak interim
private core of De Castro et al. [2011]11 are different from the concept defined above.
To make a more suitable comparison, consider again the economy EI , described in
Subsection 3.1. To block an allocation, a coalition only has to improve its members’
interim (expected) utilities at a unique state of nature. Consider a game with three
players N = {1, 2, 3}. Each player’s information is given by a finest partition of
Ω = {a, b}, P1 = {{a, b}}, P2 = {{a}, {b}} and P3 = P1, respectively. Set Ci = IR+
and ei ≡ 1, for all i ∈ N . Let the prior probability µ on Ω be the equiprobability
µ(a) = µ(b). The three utilities are given as follows : ψ1(x1, w) = x1, ψ3(x3, w) = x3
for all w ∈ Ω, x1, x3 ∈ IR+ and ψ2(x2, w) = x2 if w = a, and ψ2(x2, w) = 1 − x2
otherwise. Let us show that the (weak) interim private core of Hahn and Yannelis
[2001] and De Castro et al. [2011] is empty. For these core concepts, a coalition S
blocks an allocation x if it possesses an admissible allocation y ∈ TS, such that for a
given state of nature w0 ∈ Ω, one has
E(Ψi(yi)|Fi)w0 > E(Ψi(xi)|Fi)w0 , ∀i ∈ S.
In such a circumstance, let us say in the sequel that S blocks x at w0.
10see also Glycopantis et al. [2001], footnote p. 297, and Allen and Yannelis [2001]
11In which it is mentioned that the existence of this issue is an open problem, p. 528.
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Given any allocation x ∈ T ,
E(Ψi(xi)|Fi)w = xi(w), if i ∈ {1, 3}, for all w ∈ Ω.
E(Ψ2(x2)|F2)w =
{
x2(w), if w = a,
1− x2(w), if w = b.
Coalition {i}, for i = 1 or 3, blocks any allocation x, where xi(w) < 1, w ∈ {a, b}.
Then, we analyze only allocations x, where x1(w) ≥ 1 and x3(w) ≥ 1 and assume
that only e2 can be shared among the three players to maximize their utilities. Such
allocations can be written as x = (1 + α1, α2, 1 + α3), where α1, α2 and α3 are non-
negative and satisfy
∑
i αi ≡ 1 and are freely determined by any coalition containing
player 2. Let x = (1 + α1, α2, 1 + α3) be an allocation satisfying the requirements
detailed above. Note that the measurability condition implies that xi, i ∈ {1, 3} is
constant on {a, b}. We have only two possible cases :
1) for i0 ∈ {1, 3}, αi0(a) > 0. Without loss of generality, assume that i0 = 1. Then,
the coalition {2, 3} blocks x at a. A blocking allocation may be y ∈ T{2,3} given by
y2 = x2 + α1/2 and y3 = x3 + α1/2.
2) x1 ≡ x3 ≡ 1 then, x2 ≡ 1. In this case, E(Ψ2(x2)|F2)b = 0 and for instance {1, 2}
blocks x at b by playing the allocation y ∈ T{1,2} given by
y1 ≡ x1 + 1/2 and y2 ≡ 1/2.
This proves that the weak interim private core is empty. It is easy to check that the
allocation x = (1, 1, 1) belongs to the interim core introduced in this paper. Note that
the weak interim private core discussed in this example is shown to be nonempty
when stated under ambiguity aversion and complete preferences [De Castro et al.,
2011]. In particular, the measurability of player strategies is relaxed in this study,
which, like the ambiguity setting, is incompatible with our interim aspect and renders
the defined core impossible to compare with our concept.
4 Comment on information sharing
One can elaborate, in our context, a core concept in which information can be shared. Let
us illustrate this by providing details using the normal form game defined in section 2.
If information sharing is permitted, then we find it convenient that players evaluate their
payoffs by means of the conditional expectation with respect to all known information
at the negotiation date. Furthermore, it is natural to consider that players update their
expected utilities relative to the information they possess at the negotiation step. However,
the (direct) intuitive formulation of such a concept, which can be stated as follows, is
problematic :
Definition 4. A coalition S blocks a given strategy x ∈ A, if there exists an event F ∈
∨
j∈S
Fj, there exists ε > 0, and if S has an admissible strategy yS ∈ AS, such that, for all
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y−S ∈ A−S
E(Ui(yS, y−S)| ∨
j∈S
Fj)w > E(Ui(x)| ∨
j∈S
Fj)w + ε, for a.e. w ∈ F, ∀i ∈ S
The interim fine core of G is the set of non-blocked strategies.
Indeed, if player i can access the information carried by ∨
i∈N
Fi by joining the grand coalition,
it is not meaningful to say that he participates in a proper coalition S and evaluates his
welfare by E(U(.)| ∨
i∈S
Fi). Indeed, he is assumed to discern the finer events contained in
∨
i∈N
Fi, and then the mean of his payoffs on events of ∨
i∈S
Fi cannot matter to him.
If we assume that each player intends to share his information with all or some of the other
players, then the previous interim core can be generalized to encompass this situation.
Indeed, it suffices to set Hi as the finest information that player i may possess at the
negotiation step. Then the interim core, defined above, may be applied to this situation,
by replacing Fi with Hi in definition 1. For instance, a fine core concept can be defined as
follows :
Definition 5. A coalition S blocks a given strategy x ∈ A, if there exists an event F ∈
∧
i∈S
Hi, there exists ε > 0, and if S possesses an admissible strategy yS ∈ AS, such that, for
all y−S ∈ A−S
E(Ui(yS, y−S)|Hi)w > E(Ui(x)|Hi)w + ε, for a.e. w ∈ F, ∀i ∈ S
The interim fine core of G is the set of non-blocked strategies.
By setting Hi = ∨
j∈N
Fj, for all i ∈ N , we obtain a particular interim core in which all the
information is shared. Then, these interim fine cores are nonempty following the theorems
shown above. This definition seems to allow the formation of coalitions that can use the
information of the remaining players to object to a status-quo allocation, which is an
undesirable effect. However, because the defined concepts are nonempty, this can instead
be seen as a stability property. That is, even if coalitions are tempted to behave in such a
way, they cannot form by improving their members’ payoffs.
Acknowledgement
The author is very grateful to an anonymous referee for his reading and suggestions that
significantly improved the quality of this paper.
18
References
B Allen. Cooperative theory with incomplete information. Staff Report 225, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, 1996.
B Allen. Market games with asymmetric information : the core. Economic Theory, 29:
465–487, 2006.
B Allen and NC Yannelis. Differential information economies : introduction. Economic
Theory, 18:263–273, 2001.
A Angelopoulos and LC Koutsougeras. Value allocation under ambiguity. Economic The-
ory, 59:147–167, 2015.
Y Askoura, M Sbihi, and H Tikobaini. The ex ante α-core for normal form games with
uncertainty. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49:157–162, 2013.
RJ Aumann. The core of a cooperative game without side payments. Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society, 98:539–552, 1961.
LI De Castro, M Pesce, and NC Yannelis. Core and equilibria under ambiguity. Economic
Theory, 48:519–548, 2011.
J Diestel, WM Ruess, and W Schachermayer. Weak compactness in l1(µ, x). Proceedings
of the American Mathematical Society, 118:447–453, 1993.
F Forges, E Minelli, and R Vohra. Incentives and the cores of an exchange economy : A
survey. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38:1–41, 2002.
D Glycopantis, A Muir, and NC Yannelis. An extensive form interpretation of the private
core. Economic Theory, 18:293–319, 2001.
G Hahn and NC Yannelis. Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information
economies. Economic Theory, 10:383–411, 1997.
G Hahn and NC Yannelis. Coalitional bayesian nash implementation in differential infor-
mation economies. Economic Theory, 18:485–509, 2001.
JC Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian” players (i-iii).
Management Science 1967; 14; 159-182. Management Science 1967; 14; 320-334. Man-
agement Science 1968; 14; 486-502, 1967.
A Kajii. A generalization of scarf’s theorem : an α-core existence theorem without tran-
sitivity or completeness. Journal of Economic Theory, 56:194–205, 1992.
T Kobayashi. Equilibrium contracts for syndicates with differential information. Econo-
metrica, 48:1635–1665, 1980.
19
LC Koutsougeras and NC Yannelis. Incentive compatibility and information superiority
of the core of an economy with differential information. Economic Theory, 3:195–216,
1993.
M Noguchi. Cooperative equilibria of finite games with incomplete information. Journal
of mathematical economics, 55:4–10, 2014.
A Okada. Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core. Journal of
Economic Theory, 147:1165–1190, 2012.
FH. Page. Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity
spaces : the core. Economic Theory, 9:151–159, 1997.
R Radner. Competitive equilibrium under uncertainty. Econontetrica, 36:31–58, 1968.
HE Scarf. The core of an n-person game. Econometrica, 35:50–69, 1967.
HE Scarf. On the existence of a cooperative solution for a general class of n-person games.
Journal of Economic Theory, 3:169–181, 1971.
K Serfes. Non-myopic learning in differential information economics : the core. Economic
Theory, 18:333–348, 2001.
A U¨lger. Weak compactness in l1(µ, x). Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society,
113:143–149, 1991.
O Volij. Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asym-
metric information. International Journal of Game Theory, 29:63–79, 2000.
S Weber. Some results on the weak-core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many
players. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 8:101–111, 1981.
R Wilson. Information, efficiency and the core of an economy. Econometrica, 46:807–816,
1978.
NC Yannelis. The core of an economy with differential information. Economic Theory, 1:
183–198, 1991.
20
